Since the summer of 2022, the Putin administration has been enticing career officials to work in Ukraine’s occupied territories by promising them unbeatable salaries and promotions afterwards. Many bureaucrats have answered the call, happy to do the Kremlin’s bidding in a war zone if it means eventually getting a governorship back in Russia. But two years in, some are realizing that the professional advancement they were promised isn’t materializing — and they’re seeking to leave their posts at the first opportunity. Meduza special correspondent Andrey Pertsev explains.
On April 26, Russian state media reported that Denis Pushilin, the head of the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DNR”) had dismissed his chief of staff, Alexander Kostomarov. Previously a deputy governor in multiple Russian regions, Kostomarov is one of the highest-profile Russian officials the Kremlin has sent to work in Ukraine’s occupied territories.
As Pushilin’s second-in-command, Kostomarov was responsible for handling political issues in the “DNR” such as Moscow’s “elections” there. Meduza’s sources close to the Putin administration have referred to him as the “local [Sergey] Kiriyenko,” a reference to the head of the Kremlin’s domestic politics bloc.
According to an acquaintance of his who spoke to Meduza, Kostomarov hoped his stint in the Donbas would lead to a governorship in one of Russia’s regions:
First, he oversaw the “referendum” [on Russia’s annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory], then he did the “elections” for governors and deputies [in 2023]. Then came the presidential election. It wasn’t just him who wanted this, it was also the presidential administration. Now you might say the mission is over. Alexander was not going to stay there.
Two sources close to the Putin administration noted that Kostomarev isn’t the only prominent Russian official trying to leave a post in the occupied territories: Sergey Tolmachev, a Moscow-imposed deputy governor in the occupied part of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, is planning to leave as well. He previously held the same position in annexed Sevastopol, overseeing the election campaigns of Kremlin-supported candidates.
One of the sources said that Tolmachev, unlike Kostomarov, was not opposed to eventually becoming the head of an occupied Ukrainian region. Like Kostomarov, however, he had his sights set on a governorship in Russia after that.
Tolmachev and Kostomarov’s cases aren’t anomalous. In the early months of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Putin administration began actively encouraging Russian officials to work in the occupied territories: besides there being a personnel shortage there, the Kremlin simply didn’t trust local officials to handle things on their own. To attract politicians whose loyalty and competence had been proven, the Kremlin promised them rapid career growth, large payouts, and inclusion in the president’s “new personnel pool” for future appointments. Numerous regional officials found this appealing and set off for the “new territories.”
A source close to the Putin administration noted:
More recently, the officials who’ve taken jobs there probably view it more as a shift they’re taking [rather than as a permanent position]. At the beginning [in 2022], a lot of people still thought they’d be able to stay there: the war would end and money would flood in. But nothing like has happened: the war is dragging on and people are stuck in their posts. […] People leave as soon as they get the opportunity. For Kostomarov, the opportunity came after the [presidential] elections.
According to a source close to the Putin administration, Sergey Tolmachev decided to leave occupied Ukraine when he realized he wasn’t going to become governor of the Zaporizhzhia region; this was confirmed by a source from the United Russia party. On April 27, former Chelyabinsk regional governor Irina Gekht became head of the region’s Moscow-backed government, and according to a source close to the Putin administration, she may soon be appointed governor.
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Meanwhile, a source who knows Kostomarov said that the Kremlin isn’t planning any serious personnel changes this year among the country’s governors. “Everything is on hold [with Kostomarov’s career] for now,” he said.
No fitting position has been found to “reward” Sergey Tolmachev either. A source close to the Putin administration told Meduza that the Kremlin is planning for the ex-governor to help assemble teams of strategists to work on regional elections — a job he’s unlikely to be enthusiastic about.
Both sources close to the Kremlin stressed that the president’s team has no major issues with Kostomarov or Tolmachev’s work. According to the sources, the authorities are satisfied, for example, with the outcome of the “elections” in the annexed Ukrainian territories. (Vladimir Putin won 95.23 percent of the vote in the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and 92.83 percent in the Zaporizhzhia region, according to official figures.)
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“Kiriyenko personally came to the [presidential] elections and spoke to Kostomarov and Tolmachev, and he’s happy with everything. But there just aren’t free positions right now,” said one source.
Despite the way Kostomarov and Tolmachev’s situations have unfolded, the Russian authorities are still working to get officials to take jobs in occupied Donbas by convincing them it’s an easy way to climb the career ladder. Another popular career shortage is to take part in the war itself. As a rule, however, promotions after those who have worked in annexed territories or fought on the front still go to people who have long been in the Kremlin’s “personnel pool” or have past experience in the government.
But a regional official who knows Kostomarov and Tolmachev said other officials are paying attention: “What happened to Kostomarov and Tolmachev is clearly not motivating anyone to try their luck and build a career over there.”
Meduza reached out to Alexander Kostomarov and the Zaporizhzhia region’s Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media but had not received a response at the time of this article’s publication.
Reporting by Andrey Pertsev. Translation by Sam Breazeale.
